Introduction to Naturalism as a Philosophical Position

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How is Naturalism Defined?

Our Provisional, Working Definition

On the Home page of this website, we provisionally defined Naturalisms as follows:

Naturalism is the position that we are wholly natural beings inhabiting a wholly natural world and that, in particular,

• knowledge of the world comes wholly from our natural faculties: perception and emotion, memory and intellect, and
• we have no experience of supernatural beings or of supernatural features of the world or ourselves, and 
• experiences of values, including moral and aesthetic values, are also wholly natural features of our wholly natural world.

Alternative Definitions

It is not difficult to find alternative definitions. Here are some examples:

The Wikipedia Definition of Naturalism

The Wikipedia ^[WK1] article on Naturalism (philosophy) quotes the Oxford English Dictionary Online ^[OE1] definition of Naturalism as:

In philosophy, naturalism is the "idea or belief that only natural (as opposed to supernatural or spiritual) laws and forces operate in the world."

and goes on to say:

Adherents of naturalism (i.e., naturalists) assert that natural laws are the rules that govern the structure and behavior of the natural universe, that the changing universe at every stage is a product of these laws.

The Naturalism.org Definition of Naturalism

The Naturalism.org^[NT1] article on Worldview Naturalism ^[NT1.2017a] defines Naturalism this way:

Naturalism, in essence, is simply the idea that human beings are completely included in the natural world: there’s nothing supernatural about us. Naturalism is based on science as the best, most reliable means for discovering what exists. Science shows that each and every aspect of a human being comes from and is completely connected to the natural world, and is understandable in terms of those connections.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Definition of Naturalism

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy^[IE1] article on Naturalism ^[EI1.2017a] defines Naturalism this way

Naturalism is an approach to philosophical problems that interprets them as tractable through the methods of the empirical sciences or at least, without a distinctively a priori project of theorizing.

And then continues:

For much of the history of philosophy it has been widely held that philosophy involved a distinctive method, and could achieve knowledge distinct from that attained by the special sciences. Thus, metaphysics and epistemology have often jointly occupied a position of "first philosophy," laying the necessary grounds for the understanding of reality and the justification of knowledge claims. Naturalism rejects philosophy's claim to that special status. Whether in epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, or other areas, naturalism seeks to show that philosophical problems as traditionally conceived are ill-formulated and can be solved or displaced by appropriately naturalistic methods. Naturalism often assigns a key role to the methods and results of the empirical sciences, and sometimes aspires to reductionism and physicalism. However, there are many versions of naturalism and some are explicitly non-scientistic. What they share is a repudiation of the view of philosophy as exclusively a priori theorizing concerned with a distinctively philosophical set of questions.

The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Characterization of Naturalism

The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ^[SE1] article on Naturalism ^[SE1.2015a] declines to offer a definition, instead commenting:

The term “naturalism” has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy. Its current usage derives from debates in America in the first half of the last century. The self-proclaimed “naturalists” from that period included John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook and Roy Wood Sellars. These philosophers aimed to ally philosophy more closely with science. They urged that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing “supernatural”, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the “human spirit” (Krikorian 1944; Kim 2003).

 

So understood, “naturalism” is not a particularly informative term as applied to contemporary philosophers. The great majority of contemporary philosophers would happily accept naturalism as just characterized—that is, they would both reject “supernatural” entities, and allow that science is a possible route (if not necessarily the only one) to important truths about the “human spirit”.

Philosophical Naturalism - As We See It

Positional Naturalism and Experiential Naturalism

Our provisional definition, as well as the alternative definitions, define Naturalism as a position and, implicitly or explicitly, a philosophical position.

But it is not defending a position which makes a Naturalist a Naturalist. Many who we would count as Naturalists are not philosophers or even users of language. For example, we count many animals and human children as Naturalists.

We distinquish between Naturalism as a position and Naturalism as a way of experiencing the world or, to put it more compactly, between positional Naturalism and experiential Naturalism. Positional Naturalism, in part, attempts to describe in language the content of experiential Naturalism. But it is not necessary to be able to describe an experience in order to experience it. Animals and children can therefore be experiential Naturalists without being positional Naturalists.

An adequate definition of Naturalism should be grounded in experience that we share with animals and children but it need not be limit itself to these experiences.

Positional Naturalisms

Given the range of characterizations cited previously, one could reasonably think that "Naturalism" (as a position)described a group of related, but distinct philosophical positions. There is however a core to these characterizations, grounded in experiential Naturalism, which we want to identify as Naturalism. Although other naturalisms add to that core, we wish to use qualifiers to distinquish them from the core which we see as common to all the qualified naturalisms.

Often the qualification involves some additional commitment to a theory of knowledge.  We are happy to speak of Empiricist Naturalism, of Realist Naturalism and even of Kantian Naturalism or Rationalist Naturalism where the proponents add, respectively, the Empiricist, Realist, Kantian and Rationalist theories of knowledge to the core Naturalism. 

At other times, the qualificiation involves some additional commitment to a theory of value. In such cases, we are happy to speak of Epicurean Naturalism, Utilitarian Naturalism, Nietzschean Naturalism, Humanist Naturalism or Ideal Spectator Naturalism according to the theory of value added to the core.

In our view, the core position describes our ordinary, individual experiences of the world.  It includes a host of objects of ordinary sizes, of other people and other creatures, of numerous patterns of behavior and of emotions, thoughts and dreams and, finally, it includes both what we take as real and what we take as appearances, such as changes in appearance and perspective due to motion and light conditions, reflections, illusions  and delusions.  Our natural experiences include testimony from others concerning spirits or communications with deities but not experiences of spirits or deities. The core provides the content of what needs to be explained.  In cases of testimony concerning the supernatural, the existence of the testimony is accepted but its content is explained as illusion or delusion on the part of the testifier.

Where the core determines what is to be explained, the various additions serve as alternative means of providing the explanations.  The additions may include postulated objects and events, unobserved or unobservable,  which underlie our ordinary experiences.

To sum up, the naturalistic core provides the totality of what needs to be explained while the additions provide the totality of resources for providing the explanations themselves.

Images of Experience

The American philosopher Wilfred Sellars ^{[SW1] [SW1.1963a] [SW1.1968a]} distinquished between a "Manifest Image" of our experience and a "Scientific Image" of our experience.  The Manifest Image is similar, if not the same, as our concept of core Naturalism.  The Scientific Image includes entities not perceived directly, like atoms and elementary particles, forces and fields, which are postulated by scientific theories.  The intent is to expalin the entities of the Manifest Image in terms of the entities of the Scientific Image.  Sellars held that we required both the Manifest Image and the Scientific Image and that although the Scientific Image could modify or influence the Manifest Image, it could not displace it.  Some of Sellars' students, notably Paul Churchland^{[CP2] [CP2.1986a]}, argue for the possibility that the Scientific Image can displace or eliminate the Manifest Image.

This concept of a Manifest Image is related to the concept of The Observable.  There is a tradition in the philosophy of science dividing entities into the observable and the theoretical.  Observable entities are entities we can observe using normal perception, like trees, rocks, tables, chairs and other people. Theoretical entities are entities postulated by theories:

• some of which are observables (like observable masses, such as the Sun and Stars, the Moon and Planets, and observable animals and plants of various species and rocks of various types
• and some of which are unobservable, like elementary particles, electromagnetic fields and forces.

A number of problems plague this distinction.  Here are some examples of these problems: does what we observe through a magnifying glass count as observable? through an optical microscope or telescope? through an electron microscope?  Are red and green observables for someone who is red/green color blind?

We hold that there is no clear boundary between what is observable and what is unobservable. Rather what is observable is relative to the conditions of observation. Rather than say that an object is observable, we would say that the object is observable unaided by someone with normal vision under normal lighting or that the object is observable under a 100 X optical microscope by someone with normal vision under normal lighting. This allows us to say that infrared is observable by a bee with normal vision (for bees) under normal lighting. This also allows us to say that electric fields are observable by electric eels and objects are observable via sonar images by bats and cetaceans.

There is also a traditional distinction between direct and indirect observation When we observe a pattern of iron filings in the presence of a magnetic field, some would say that we directly observe the iron filings and the pattern they form but indirectly observe the magnetic field. This does not make the magnetic field observable since its existence must be inferred from the observable pattern of the filings.

The concept of the Manifest Image is connected to the concept of observable as follows. Each of us has a Manifest Image containing everything we can observe under any conditions of observation available to us.  This conception means that the Manifest Image is different for each person (or creature) and is different for each creature from time to time as different conditions of observation come available.

The concept of a theoretical entity is also relative.  An entity is a theoretical entity of a theory if and only if the theory includes the existence of an entitiy.  Theoretical entities are normally types¹ of entities.

Newton's Theory of Gravitation includes masses and forces of attraction between masses as theoretical entities.  It does not include the Sun, the Earth and the Moon as theoretical entities.  It is up to the Newtonian theorist to identify the Sun, the Earth and the Moon as masses.  To connect theory to experience, the theorist must identify observable entities as theoretical entities of certain kinds.  As well, the orbit of the Earth around the Sun and the Moon around the Earth are observable behaviors of observable objects.  Again, the theorist must identify the orbits with theoretical motions governed by the Law of Attraction.  Finally, to use the theory to explain her experience, the theorist must construct a theoretical model of the Sun, Earth and Moon system by specifying the states of the mapped observables in terms of mapped observable properties of the objects (in this case, the mass, the position and the velocity of each object).²

We divide Sellars' Scientific Image into one or more Theoretical Images and a single, changing Meta-theoretical Image which we count as the Scientific Image.

We begin our search for the core with an examination of problems exhibited by one or more of the various definitions and characterizations. 

Problems with the Definitions of Naturalism

Our Home page definition of Naturalism is too restrictive. Although it provides sufficient conditions to identify someone as a Naturalist, it is too strong to provide the necessary conditions.  In particular, it would exclude a number of people who ought to be considered Naturalists.

Irrelevant Uses of the Term "Naturalism"

"Naturalism" has been applied to approaches to the visual arts, lierature, theater, gardening and even used as a synonym for nudism.  For our present purposes, these uses are irrelevant. Instead, we will focus on Naturalism as a way in which we (and other beings) experience the world.

The Problem of Historical Naturalists

The history of philosophy provides a number of examples of philosophers we would want to count as Naturalists but who would be excluded by some of the characterizations given above.  Examples include the Philosophical Taoists, some of the Pre-Socratic philosophers, all of the Greek Atomists, possibly Aristotle, the Utilitarians, Frederick Nietzsche and Karl Marx.

Philosophical Taoists

One of the three main interpretations of the Lao Tsu's Taoist text, Tao Te Ching (The Way and Its Power) should be considered Naturalist.

In this interpretation, the Tao is neither a thing or an event but the pattern which defines all things and all events. It defines both what there is and how what there is changes. A Wise Person observes the patterns the Tao exhibits and lives in harmony with those patterns.  It is possible for a Foolish Person to try to thwart the Tao but their efforts will be overcome by the Tao.  A Wise Person acts in accordance with the Tao.  Where a Foolish Person would build a dam, the Wise Person diverts a stream close to its source to move water where it is needed.

An analogy to the Tao would be a sort of combination of Periodic Table of the Elements and Natural Laws of Chemical Combinations.

The postulation of the Tao is clearly a theory.  Moreover it is a universal and systematic theory since it commits to the existence of types of things (its ontology), patterns of changes (its cosmology), observation of patterns as the source of knowledge (its epistemology) and an ethical prescription to act in accord with Nature (its ethics).

Now the types of things to which the theory commits are the ordinary objects of our experience, earth, water, air, fire, clouds, sun, moon, stars, plants, animals and people.  And the patterns of changes are what those things always do.  Earth always falls back to earth, water always runs downhill, fire burns plants and animals, the sun and moon rise and set and traverse the sky. All of this can be known by anyone who will but observe the patterns.  And anyone with any sense knows to act in accordance with observed patterns and not against them.

Taoism commits to a single theory and its evidence is what is observed, both simple and sophisticated.  There is no separation between the organizing principles of matter (things) and organizing principles of change (events). It is all the Tao. There is no reference to natural law other than to observed patterns of change. There is no reference to science nor to any method of aquiring knowledge other than by observation. There is no denial of the supernatural or even acknowledgment of such a concept.

According to the definitions and characterizations given earlier (including our own), Taoism is not a type of Naturalism.  We believe, however, that Philosophical Taoism is close to the core of what we should consider Naturalism.  In particular, we believe that the commitment to types of (observable) things and their (observable) behavior as being of one piece is more fundamental to core Naturalism than is a commitment to Science. In addition, we believe the commitment to patterns of organization and change is more fundmental than a commitment to laws. Finally, the positive assertion that all things and events conform to natural patterns is more fundamental than the negative assertion that there is no supernatural reality.

The Pre-Socratic Philosophers

There are too many Pre-Socratic Philosophers to consider them all here.  We examine three, Thales, Heraclitus and Anaximander, to will indicate the significance of the group to Naturalism.

Thales

Thales is generally acknowledged as the first philosopher in the Greek tradition.

He held that all of reality was made of mixtures of states of a single element, water. Earth is compressed water. Air is rarefied water. Clouds change into rain. Plants absorb water and grow, In the morning, water appears on the underside of leaves.

Changes were transformations between states of water or changes in the composition of mixtures of states of water.

Thales was familiar with the magnetic properties of lodestones and electric properties of rubbed amber. Their effects on other objects lead him to believe that all things were alive.  There was no boundary between living and non;living.

Thales committed to a single theory of the material nature of the world and its evidence is the transformations he observed.  He separates the organizing principles of matter from the organizing principles of change. There is no reference to natural law other than to observed transformations and the assumption that all changes are transformations of observed types or yet to be observed types. There is no reference to science nor to any method of aquiring knowledge other than by observation.

Although Aristotle claimed that Thales saw gods in everything. This divinity of things was not supernatural, but a claim that all things have active powers, that is, ability to effect changes in other things.

Thales' model for the power to change things is the experience of his own mind's ability to effect change. It was a mistake to assume that the only means by which one thing can affect another is mental and that therefore everything must have a mind.  This mistake makes Thales theory false but it does not make it supernaturalistic.

We turn next to Heraclitus.

Heraclitus

Heraclitus held that everything is some form of fire. And everything which happens happens in accordance with the Logos. One interpretation of the Logos is to identify the Logos with Natural Law. However, it may simply mean an account.

He also held that everything is in a constant state of flux. Fire turns, in part, to water, which turns, in part to earth and in part to air. Heraclitus says:

This world, which is the same for all, no one of gods or men has made. But it always was and will be: an ever-living fire, with measures of it kindling, and measures going out. 

The transformation of fire is a displacement of one element by another.  Heraclitus again:

The death of fire is the birth of air, and the death of air is the birth of water.

For Heraclitus, fire is the fundamental element in that it is the source other of elements. All things are either elements or mixtures of the fire-sourced elements.

The soul is a mixture of fire and water, with fire as the noble part of the soul, and water as  ignoble part. A noble soul is more full of fire and less full of water. Worldly pleasures make  the soul "moist". Mastering worldly desires purifies the soul's fire.

As with elemental fire, one can never touch the same object twice, so objects must be renewed from moment to moment. An object is a harmony between a building up and a tearing down. Heraclitus calls the oppositional processes "strife", and  the apparently stable state "justice" which is a harmony of the oppositional processes.

Heraclitus advises people to follow the common path and not live according to their own judgment. He distinguishes between human laws and divine law.

---STUB: Heraclitus completed

Anaximander

---STUB: Anaximander

Greek Atomists and Epicureans

---STUB:Greek Atomists and Epicureans

Leucippus and Democritus

---STUB:Leucippus and Democritus

Epicurus and Lucretius

---STUB:Epicurus and Lucretius

Stoics

Stoicism, as a philosophical school, flourished between the 3rd century BC and the 3rd century Ad. Beginning with the Greeks, it became the dominant philosophy of the Roman Empire. Stoicism declined with the growth of Christianity in the 3rd century AD.

The Stoics believed that their philosophy was derived from the thought of Heraclitus, discussed above. The influence of Heraclitus on the Stoics is most evident in the works of the Roman emperor Marcus_Aurelius.

---STUB:Stoics completed

Aristotle

---STUB:Aristotle

The Utilitarians

---STUB:The Utilitarians

Bentham and Mill

---STUB:Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill

Hume

---STUB:David Hume

Smith

---STUB:Adam Smith

Darwin and Nietzsche

--STUB:Darwin and Nietzsche

Darwin

---STUB:Charles Darwin

Nietzsche

---STUB:Frederick Nietzsche

The Marxists

---STUB:The Marxists

Marx and Engels

---STUB:Karl Marx and Frederick Engels.

Lenin

---STUB:Vladimir Lenin

The Problem of Child Naturalists

An infant is presented with a jumble of sensations and experiences which it organizes into a representation of the world. We argue that the earliest of these representations are suitably classified as naturalistic.

Although these first representations are tactile, olifactory, gustatory, auditory and visual, we concentrate on the visual here.

The first visual representations are of regions of color, light and shade.  At some point, a child recognizes boundaries between the perceived regions and eventually that the boundaries enclose objects.

---STUB:The Problem of Child Naturalists 

The Problem of Animal Naturalists

---STUB:The Problem of Animal Naturalists

The Problem of Appearances

---STUB:The Problem of Appearances

The Problem of Delusions

---STUB:The Problem of Delusions

Is Naturalism a Philosophical Position or a Philosophical Research Program?

---STUB

If Naturalism is a Philosophical Position, Is it an Ontological Position?

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If Naturalism is a Philosophical Position, Is it an Cosmological Position?

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If Naturalism is a Philosophical Position, Is it an Epistemological Position?

---STUB

If Naturalism is a Philosophical Position, Is it an Axiological Position?

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What does Naturalism Imply?

There are a number of questions about what other positions might be implied by Naturalism.  In particular,the following possible implications should be considered: Does Naturalism imply Atheism, Humanism, Realism, Materialism, Physical Determinism, Logical Determinism, Hard Determinism (No Free Will), Empiricism, Behaviorism, Conventionalism, Instrumentalism, Scientific Realism, Evolutionary Epistemology, the Impossibility of Morality, the Possibilty of a Science of Ethics.

And lastly, does Naturalism imply Scientific Naturalism?

Are There Types of Naturalism?

---STUB

Can Naturalism be Verified or Falsified?

---STUB

Is it Rational to be a Naturalist?

---STUB 

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Footnotes:

1. Theoretical Entities are not always types.  In Newtonian Gravitational Theory, Space and Time are individuals rather than types.

2. In this case, as well as most, if not all cases, succeeding states calculated using the theory will not match the observed succeeding states exactly.  There are several sources of error.  First, the model represents only three objects while the observed world contains numerous other objects including other planets, moons, asteroids, comets, stars, meteors and dust, all of which exert gravitational forces.  Second, the represented states are neither wholly accurate or wholly precise.  Inaccuracy and imprecision is another source of differences between the observed and model behaviors. Worst of all, even if all the objects were accounted for and modelled with complete accuracy and precision, there would remain a mismatch because the law of Attraction specifies the force between two bodies.  Although the combined forces on three bodies can be calculated for an instant, there is in general no mathematical way to exactly calculate the force through a succession of instants.  The best that can be done is provide an approximation which can be inproved by shortening the distance between the calculated instants.  This is the notorious Three Body Problem.

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